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I
n 2001 the venture capital industry experi-
enced its biggest decline ever. According to the
National Venture Capital Association (NVCA),
investments by venture capital firms in the
fourth quarter of 2001 were at $7.1 billion. This
amount was approximately a third of the level
the year before, which was $20.9 billion. Similarly,
the amount of money raised by venture capital firms
in the fourth quarter of 2001 was $4.6 billion, an
80 percent drop from the previous year’s $23.4 billion.
This decline has raised alarm bells with many people
questioning whether this trend signals the eventual
demise of venture capital.
However, it is important to put these numbers in
perspective. The level of venture capital investments
in the last quarter of 2001 was slightly more than in
the first quarter of 1999. The $36.5 billion invested
in 2001 is more than six times larger than the annual
amount of $5.9 billion invested in 1995. In terms
of total dollars invested, 2001 ranks as the venture
capital industry’s third-best year. The developments
of 2001 are thus a mere kink in an otherwise excep-
tional growth curve of the venture capital industry.
Whether the industry is in a boom or a bust depends
only on one’s perspective. In the short term, the
industry would appear to be in a bust, but in the long
term it seems to be on a strong growth trajectory.
A similar picture emerges from the data on the
rates of return to venture capital investors. The aver-
age one-year return to limited partners of venture
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capital funds was –18.2 percent. But the three-year
returns were 54.5 percent, and the ten-year returns
were 28.4 percent. These numbers are not always
entirely reliable because losses may be (it is widely
suspected) underdeclared in the industry. This prac-
tice might bias returns upwards, but it is not clear
how under-reporting affects the temporal variation
in returns. The differences in returns over time pro-
vide an important message: While the short-term
performance of the industry is weak, the long-term
performance is strong. 
Where do the recent losses come from? The
highest losses were recorded in telecommunications
(–38.3 percent) and in Internet-related ventures
(–27.7 percent). Not surprisingly, these industries
also have exceptional three-year returns of 69.7 per-
cent and 35.7 percent, respectively. Clearly, the
Internet and related telecom boom and bust had a
significant effect on the venture capital industry.
What are we to make to make of this curious dif-
ference between short- and long-term performance?
On the one hand, the venture capital industry seems
to be a fundamentally strong and vibrant part of
the economy. On the other hand, it seems to have
recently undergone some dramatic changes. This
paper first provides an overview of some of our
research on the fundamental role of venture capital.
In the spirit of suggesting future research topics, we
also discuss how recent developments might have
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The unique feature of this project is that, while it
examines an environment in which venture capital
is prominent, the sampling procedure itself is not
contingent on the presence of venture capital. As a
consequence, the sample naturally generates varia-
tion between firms that do and do not obtain ven-
ture capital. Another advantage of SPEC is that it
uses a large variety of data collection methods, all
involving surveys, interviews, and direct observa-
tion of both quantitative and qualitative informa-
tion. While any one method of data collection has its
strength and weaknesses, the compilation of various
methods gives us greater confidence in the validity
of our results. 
The SPEC data allow us to ask some simple ques-
tions about the “real” effects of venture capital—
the effects that venture capital has on the growth
path of companies. This inquiry is divided into two
parts: the effects of venture capital on the market
position of firms and the effects of venture capital
inside the firm itself. 
The Effect of Venture Capital on 
Firms’ Market Position
I
n the first paper (Hellmann and Puri 2000) we
examined the influence of venture capital on the
time it takes a company to bring its product to mar-
ket. The first sale of a product is an important mile-
stone for a company. It proves something about the
viability of the product, and it might allow the firm
to establish itself as a first mover in the market. Our
data allow us to identify not only the point in time
when a company takes its product to market but
also the point when it obtains venture capital for
the first time. To analyze this data, we use a dura-
tion model that allows us to estimate how much the
probability of taking a product to market increases
with the advent of a venture capitalist. We find that
venture capital has a statistically significant effect.
Relative to a baseline probability of bringing a prod-
uct to market, venture capital increases this base-
line probability by 79 percent. This finding suggests
that venture capitalists can have a dramatic effect
on a company’s market performance. 
Naturally, we have to ask to what extent this
result stems from venture capitalists’ selecting better
companies versus venture capitalists’ helping com-
panies to become better. We perform a number of
additional tests that suggest that selection alone
does not drive these results. Along similar lines, the
work of Kaplan and Strömberg (2001a, b) empha-
sizes that venture capitalists play a dual role of first
carefully selecting companies and then monitoring
them over time. 
The Fundamental Role of Venture Capital
T
he question of what venture capitalists do has
received surprising little academic scrutiny.
The most obvious reason for this dearth of research
is that good data are extremely difficult to find. The
main sources of data about the industry are Venture
Economics and Venture One. These firms rely on
the industry’s voluntary participation and are often
unable to obtain some of the more sensitive but
valuable information. Moreover, these data-collection
firms tend to focus on easily measurable events,
such as who receives money from whom, how much,
and when.
Early field research (such as the work by Gorman
and Sahlman 1989 and Sahlman 1990) suggested
that the value of venture capital lies in providing
not only money but also ancillary services, such as
selecting good firms, mentoring entrepreneurs, hiring
executives, formulating strategies, and “profession-
alizing” companies. 
If the chief value of venture capital is the provision
of these ancillary services, two significant research
problems arise. First, how should such services be
measured? And second, what should venture capi-
tal be compared to? If one relies only on the indus-
try data, then the problem is that venture capitalists
can be compared only to each other. Such research
would be unable, by its design, to unearth those
effects that are common to all venture capitalists.
To identify those effects, we need to compare ven-
ture capital–backed companies to other companies
that receive financing from other sources of private
equity, mainly angels and corporations. 
The Stanford Project on Emerging Companies
(SPEC) provides a unique opportunity to examine
the fundamental contributions of venture capital-
ists. SPEC is an interdisciplinary research project,
involving researchers from a variety of academic
disciplines. The project’s objective is to under-
stand the development of high-technology start-
ups in Silicon Valley. The sample consists of over
170 such firms. 
The question of what venture capitalists do has
received surprising little academic scrutiny. The
most obvious reason for this dearth of research
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Time to market means different things to differ-
ent companies. In a new industry time to market is
particularly critical as companies are vying for first-
mover advantages. We therefore use some of the
more detailed information that we have on the sam-
ple companies. In particular, we divide firms into
two camps: those that are pursuing truly innovative
opportunities versus those that plan to compete in
already-established industries. We find that innova-
tor firms take somewhat longer to bring a product
to market, a finding consistent with the notion that
such firms have a longer development cycle. The
interesting effect we then find, however, is that ven-
ture capital helps to speed up time to market, espe-
cially among innovator companies. Such companies
are precisely the ones that have a greater challenge
to bring their product to market and the greatest
strategic interest in being fast to market. The inter-
esting result is that for these companies the effect
of venture capital is strongest. 
Does this result also mean that such companies
are appreciative of the help that the venture capi-
talist bring to them? To fully answer that question,
we would need data on the valuations paid by dif-
ferent types of investors. Such data, however, are
extremely difficult to obtain. Indeed, while the
response rate on many survey items was over 80 per-
cent, response rates dropped below 5 percent on
any questions related to valuations. However, some-
thing that we can observe in the data is the self-
selection into venture capital. Indeed, when we
examine the likelihood of innovators’ and imitators’
choosing venture capital, we find that innovators
are more likely to obtain venture capital. This find-
ing suggests that firms might choose their investors
on the basis of what value the investors will add.
Innovators are particularly likely to benefit from
venture capital and therefore also make a better
match for venture capitalists. The relationship
between venture capital and innovation is further
corroborated in a concurrent research project by
Kortum and Lerner (2000), which examines differ-
ences in the propensity among start-up firms to
obtain patents. 
The Effects of Venture Capital Inside the Firm
I
n the second part of the research project we
“opened up the black box” to look inside firms
(Hellmann and Puri 2002). So far, our research sug-
gests an overwhelmingly positive effect for venture
capital. But is there also a “dark side” to venture
capital? Probably the most contentious issue in ven-
ture capital is the treatment of founders. Some
entrepreneurs claim that venture capitalists are
notorious for removing founders from the position
of CEO and bringing in an outsider. Venture capital-
ists tend to counter that part of the value-added
that they bring is to “professionalize” the firm. This
process may involve hiring the best possible man-
agement team, and it may imply that the founder is
replaced by an outsider in the position of CEO. 
To explore this potentially dark side of venture
capital, we examine whether the presence of a ven-
ture capitalist indeed increases the likelihood that
an outside CEO will be brought in. We find that that
this pattern does exist, and again the effect is sta-
tistically significant and economically large. But
what does it really tell us about whether these
founder replacements are friendly or hostile? While
it is clearly difficult to measure any degree of hos-
tility, we consider a noisy proxy measure. In partic-
ular, we look at whether the founder remained
involved with the company after the arrival of the
new CEO. In about 40 percent of all companies, the
founder did remained involved with the company
after the new CEO arrived. The founder remained
involved either at the level of the board of directors
or by taking a position in the company, such as chief
technology officer, vice president of business devel-
opment, or some other position. (In the case of
Yahoo—which is not part of our sample—the
founder, Jerry Yang, became “Chief Yahoo.”) 
The interesting observation is that the presence
of venture capital makes no difference to the rate of
founder retention. Moreover, the effect of venture
capital on outside CEOs appears to apply equally
whether the founder stayed or left. This evidence
thus does not support the view that venture capital-
ists treat founders in a particularly hostile manner.
But it does support the view that venture capitalists
play an active role in helping companies recruit pro-
fessional CEOs.
If venture capitalists can help a company recruit
a professional CEO, we may ask if they also have
an effect deeper down in the organization. The
strength of the SPEC data is that they feature infor-
mation about the inside of companies that is other-
wise not easily available. We examine a variety of
measures about the degree of professionalization.
For example, we look at the point at which compa-
nies introduce a stock option plan. We examine
whether companies recruit through professional
rather than informal channels. And we examine at
what point a company appoints a vice president of
marketing and sales. In each of these cases we
find that venture capital is associated with higher
degrees of professionalization. We additionally ask
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Casual observation suggests a change in the com-
petition among venture capitalists. In the “old days”
Silicon Valley was a closely knit community of a
handful of investors who knew how to avoid exces-
sive competition. Although it is hard to say exactly
when those days ended, these norms seemed to
have already weakened in the early eighties when
the industry experienced its first boom. The regime
of competition shifted to one of differentiated com-
petition. Different venture capitalists specialized in
different areas and types of investments. In this
period a number of firms established themselves
as leaders in their respective niches. For example,
Kleiner Perkins, probably the most well known ven-
ture capital firm, developed an expertise in linking
up its portfolio companies both with other portfolio
companies and with more established companies.
During this period venture capitalists also were able
to achieve high rates of returns by gaining access to
proprietary deal flow and by providing value-added
services to their portfolio companies. From a limited
partner’s perspective, venture capital is expensive
because the venture capital partners receive not only
a hefty management fee (typically around 2 percent
of the funds committed) but also a profit share
(called carry) of 20 percent. It was the unique exper-
tise and value added of the general partners that
justified this expensive arrangement. 
This structure of competition changed dramati-
cally in the midnineties with the explosion of the
Internet. The nature of competition among venture
capitalists was altered in two important ways. First,
there was massive new entry into the industry. It
is not clear how good those new entrants were in
terms of providing value-added services. Second, the
changes in the competitive landscape also affected
the more experienced venture capitalists. Venture
capitalists that before would have raised a fund of,
say, $50 million were now able to raise $500 million
and still obtain their 2 percent management fee. With
a lot more money for every partner to invest, many
experienced venture capitalists changed their busi-
ness model. They invested in many more companies
and tried to place larger sums of money into their
portfolio companies, and many venture capitalists
moved toward later-stage investing. All of these
actions may have undermined venture capitalists’
ability to focus on the value-added component of
venture capital. As the industry is currently recover-
ing from the Internet period, it will be interesting to
observe how the fundamental role of venture capital
in terms of adding value as well as money to startup
companies will further evolve. 
investors a milestone or whether investors had influ-
enced their human resource policies. Whenever the
companies had venture capital investors, they were
much more likely to respond yes to these questions.
All of this evidence strongly points in one direc-
tion: venture capitalists provide value-added ser-
vices, help to professionalize the companies they
finance, and help their companies establish them-
selves in the marketplace. Our results suggest a
new role for financial intermediaries such as ven-
ture capitalists, which we call a “support” role in
which venture capitalists exert costly effort to
enhance the value of the firm by professionalizing
the human resource base of the company. This
research highlights the importance of the ancillary
services provided by venture capital. These results
are interesting and raise a number of further ques-
tions for research: for example, to what extent do
other financial intermediaries, such as banks, pro-
vide similar support functions? The results also
suggest that theory should potentially capture
some of these roles played by venture capitalists to
address a variety of questions: for example, how do
the support and control functions interact in deter-
mining security design?
Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the 
Venture Capital Industry
T
here is one important aspect that we have not
mentioned yet. All of the companies we exam-
ined were pre-Internet, so the studies capture how
venture capital worked before the Internet boom.
One interesting challenge for future research is to
better understand how those fundamentals changed
during the Internet boom. We briefly discuss why
there are reasons to believe that the fundamentals
of the industry might have changed. We do not have
as detailed data on the effect of venture capital on
Internet companies. Our comments are therefore
somewhat speculative, meant to point toward inter-
esting research questions.
The evidence strongly points in one direction:
venture capitalists provide value-added services,
help to professionalize the companies they
finance, and help their companies establish
themselves in the marketplace.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2002
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